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"[P]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices." Adam Smith, The
Wealth of Nations1
"Every contract, combination. . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce .... is declared to be illegal." Sherman Antitrust Act,
Section 12
I. INTRODUCTION
Competitive intelligence (C.I.) gathering is an increasingly common
activity in the business world.3 Leonard Fuld, a noted business author and
corporate consultant, defined C.I. as "highly specific and timely information
about a corporation." 4 Mr. Fuld's comments regarding C.I. underscore the
need for corporations to make continuous efforts to keep their C.I. data
current:
Information that is out-of-date or too general is not competitor
intelligence. Instead, it represents history and background data. Rapidly
changing and detailed information on your competitor is a highly
perishable commodity. Much like a container of milk, it has a short
shelf-life. Once the information is allowed to sit around and not be used,
its value declines rapidly.5
Some corporate managers would go so far as to consider C.I. a necessity,
without which no company could long survive in today's business world.6
With trade barriers falling worldwide, the business arena, at home and abroad,
is increasingly competitive. For example, one's competitors in the U.S.
1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 144 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
3. The competitor intelligence community has matured rapidly in recent years, forging its
own professional identity in the business world and forming its own trade association, the Society
of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), in 1986. SCIP, SOCIETY OF COMPETITIE
INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS MEMBERSHIP BROCHURE.
4. LEONARD M. FULD, COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE: How TO GET IT; How TO USE IT 9
(1985) [hereinafter COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE].
5. Id.
6. LEONARD M. FULD, MONITORING THE COMPETITION: FIND OUT WHAT'S REALLY GOING
ON OVER THERE 1-3 (1988) [hereinafter MONITORING THE COMPETITION].
[Vol. 46:263
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marketplace often include companies incorporated not just in other states but
in other nations. American firms must rise to the challenge of this new
worldwide economic contest by outperforming, or at the bare minimum
matching, their foreign counterparts in service, price, quality, and a host of
other variables that matter to customers. To accomplish this objective, U.S.
businesses must gather meaningful data on the attributes of their competitors'
services and products. Meaningful data might include a competitor's prices,
means of manufacture, sales and delivery, operating costs, construction costs,
payroll, salary structure, use of information technology and other automated
processes, organizational structure, product or service attributes, repair and
maintenance record, strategic plans for the future, and more.7 These and
other items of information aid a company in competing with its rivals.
A. Competitive Intelligence and Its Variants
Competitive intelligence has several off-shoots and variations. Bench-
marking, also known as "best practices," is a close relative of C.I. and
involves "evaluating the products, services, and work processes of organiza-
tions that are recognized as representing best practices for the purpose of
organizational improvement. "8 The company or companies that are the
subject of a benchmarking study may or may not include direct competitors of
the company conducting the survey.9 Some companies outside of a bench-
marking corporation's own product or service market may possess a reputation
for excellence in an important area such as customer service or the warehous-
ing and shipment of products. American Express is widely perceived as a
"best practices" company in customer service. Consequently, many
corporations that are not commercial competitors of American Express
nevertheless benchmark American Express to repeat its success in this area.
To cite another example, L.L. Bean is often mentioned by C.I. professionals
and consultants as a "best practices" company in the areas of warehousing and
shipment. These two examples illustrate that benchmarking may involve
studying a direct competitor but that benchmarking and C.I. activities have as
their ultimate goal the improvement and commercial success of the business
conducting the study. 10
7. See generally COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4; MONITORING THE COMPETITION,
supra note 6; Alexandra Biesada, Benchmarking, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 17, 1991, at 28.
8. MICHAEL J. SPENDOLINI, THE BENCHMARKING BOOK 9 (1992).
9. See Biesada note 7, at 28.
10. Benchmarking can be divided into several categories. Competitor benchmarking consists
of researching the strengths and weaknesses of a competitor. Process benchnarking involves an
analysis of how other companies, regardless of whether they are competitors, handle certain
processes such as billing, processing orders, direct mailing, the shipment of goods, and so on.
See Paul Taylor, How to Keep Up with the Joneses: Why Companies are Turning to Bench-
1995]
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B. The Shadowy World of Corporate Sleuthing
Mention "competitive intelligence" and some people think of men and
women in trenchcoats, wearing reflective sunglasses, peering through
windows, and breaking into offices late at night to take clandestine photo-
graphs of a competitor's files. This stereotype is completely inaccurate. C.I.
is not another term for corporate espionage. In fact, C.I. does not counte-
nance the misappropriation by theft, deception, or otherwise of proprietary
information or trade secrets from other companies." Rather, a large part of
C.I. work involves time spent in libraries and government offices researching,
among other items, a competitor's businesses, financial performance, and
operations." C.I. also depends on the use of publicly available information
such as shareholders' reports, advertising and sales literature, press releases,
news stories in the business or trade media, and published interviews of the
chief executive officer or other senior officers of a competing company. 3
These written, publicly available resources are supplemented by conversations
with knowledgeable third parties, such as local marketing and sales people,
customers, consultants, and employees.' 4 Information that cannot be derived
from public sources often becomes a job assignment for a third-party
consultant or the focus of a company-conducted survey. Ordinarily, the risk
of an antitrust violation arises only when a corporation contacts its competitors
directly for competitively sensitive information.'"
marking to Measure their Performance, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1992, at 10. Internal bench-
marking involves comparing and evaluating how different subsidiaries or departments within the
company conducting the benchmarking study handle certain functions, tasks, or processes. See
William B. Slowey, Benchmarking: Boon or Buzz Word?, ANTIrRUST, Summer 1993, at 30, 31.
For the purposes of this article, the author is most concerned with competitor benchmarking and
other forms of competitor analysis; it is these types of activities that raise antitrust issues.
Internal bencbmarking involves corporate introspection and thus should not present antitrust
problems. Process benchmarking may not involve an analysis of competitors. Of course, if
competitors are studied, antitrust issues will be implicated; however, if competitors are not
included in the study, these problems avoided. COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 17-
18.
11. See COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 17 (offering the advice "Do not
deliberately mislead to get an answer" and "Identify yourself and your company by name when
interviewing over the telephone or in person."); MONITORING THE COMPETITION, supra note 6
at 161 ("As in any business activity, stealing, trespassing, and bribery in the course of gathering
intelligence are illegal."). Fuld also lists the "10 Commandments Of Intelligence Gathering"
which are other rules of ethical intelligence gathering. See MONITORING THE COMPETITION,
supra note 6, at 167.
12. See generally COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 85-247.
13. Id. at 297-315.
14. Id. at 19-23.
15. See generally MONITORING THE COMPETITION, supra note 6, at 162.
[Vol. 46:263
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In contrast to the way in which the vast majority of U.S. and many
foreign companies operate and the way in which America's intelligence
services 16 operate, some foreign nations appear to condone outright spying
on other companies. 17 Some nations permit and even assist in the appropria-
tion of trade secrets and other competitively sensitive information to further
the commercial interests of their native industries.18 France, for example,
apparently spies on non-French business people traveling or residing in
France. 9 French intelligence reportedly forwards the results of its espionage
activities to French companies that compete with the foreign firms that have
16. America's two major intelligence agencies are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the National Security Agency (NSA). See generally David L. Boren, The Intelligence Community:
How Crucial?, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 53 (Summer 1992); Ernest L. May, Intelligence: Backing
Into The Future, 71 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 (Summer 1992). The supersecret NSA is the
"statutorily authorized collector of electronically transmitted information." John A. Nolan, I,
Government-Business Intelligence Linkages: An Idea Whose Time Has Still Not Come, 5(3)
COMPETITIvE INTELLIGENCE REvIEw 4,5 (Fall 1994). The Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI)
operates domestically and is responsible for counterintelligence, i.e., protecting the United States
and its citizenry against the uniawful activities of foreign intelligence agencies operating inside
the United States. See generally Jonathan P. Binnie, Counterintelligence in the 1990s: The Threat
To Corporate America, 5(3) COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE REvEW 17 (Fall 1994).
Since the end of the Cold War many inside and outside the intelligence community have
debated whether America's intelligence agencies should be redeployed to assist American
companies in competing against foreign firms. Id. at 4, 6-7; see Jan Herring, Intelligence to
Enhance American Companies' Competitiveness: The Government's Role and Obligation, 5(3)
COMETITIVE INTELLIGENCE REWvEw 12 (Fall 1994); Jeffry J. Roberts, Competitive Intelligence:
Fighting the Economic War With Cold War Ammunition, 5(3) COMPETrrIVE INTELLIGENCE
REvIEw 28 (Fall 1994); Boren, supra at 58 ("[C]aution must be used in the area of economic
intelligence. Spying on foreign companies to give a commercial advantage to a particular
American company would clearly compromise U.S. values and the free market system."). So far,
this has not occurred despite the fact that some other nations have used their intelligence agencies
in this manner. Nolan, supra, at 5 ("Foreign competitors, often with the active support of their
national intelligence services, have an advantage over American firms in collecting, analyzing,
and disseminating business intelligence."); Herring, supra, at 13 ("Mhe French and Russian
governments have used their national intelligence services for economic purposes... ").
17. See Walter D. Barndt, Jr., Linking Business, Government, andAcademefor a Competitive
Advantage, 5(3) COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE REvIEw 22, 23 (Fall 1994) ("Our foreign
competitors share information. The French, Israeli, and Japanese intelligence services share
information with their national businesses that give them an edge."); Nolan, supra note 16, at 5
("Foreign competitors, often with the active support of their national intelligence services, have
an advantage over American firms in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating business
intelligence."); Herring, supra note 16, at 17 ("To cap it off, Pierre Marion, the past head of the
French Intelligence Service, has openly stated that in economic matters France is a competitor
with the United States (and presumably with other Western democracies) and therefore uses its
intelligence services to promote its economic interests.").
18. See supra note 17.
19. See Herring, supra note 16, at 13; Binnie, supra note 16, at 17.
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been the targets of this government surveillance. 2° China and the formerly
Communist nations of the East Bloc also were suspected of similar activities
in the past. It is perhaps the agents of some of these governments that conjure
the image of spies in trenchcoats gaining unauthorized access to confidential
corporate information.
C. Competitive Intelligence and Antitrust
C.I. activities might raise antitrust issues depending on the kind of data
collected, the manner in which the data are collected, and the way in which
the C.I. data are presented.21 Often, the first impulse of a C.I. consultant
when handed an assignment is to call people he might know at a competing
company to discover the requested information. While, from a business
perspective, direct contact with a competitor is the quickest, most efficient
means of gathering information about the competing company, from an
antitrust perspective this conduct is one of the most dangerous steps a business
person can take. Oral or written contacts between competing companies or the
exchange of competitively sensitive files or information between them might
constitute circumstantial evidence of a contract, agreement, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its state
counterparts.' For liability to arise under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, there must be proof of an unlawful express or implied agreement between
two or more parties.' This is the so-called concerted action requirement of
Section 1.24
C.I. activities that involve direct contacts or information exchanges
between competitors are vulnerable to attack under the antitrust laws because
20. See Binnie, supra note 16, at 17.
21. See infra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
22. C.I. activities might also run afoul of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition hi or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1) (1988). Section 5 is generally acknowledged as having a broader reach than Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The Federal Trade Commission has identified the following factors as evidence
of an unfair practice: (1) the practice violates public policy as "established by statutes, the
common law, or otherwise;" (2) the practice "is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupu-
lous;" or (3) it "causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)."
FTC Policy Statement, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,203 n.8 (Dec. 17, 1980) (quoting
Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964)).
23. See Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) ("It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two
persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspirewith itself any more than
a private individual can .... ."); JULIAN 0. VON KALINoWsKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 6.01 [2] (1994).
24. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
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the contact itself might help prove an unlawful agreement.' Some activities
are per se violations of the antitrust laws.' Conduct that does not fall within
the per se category is analyzed under the rule of reason.27
An antitrust attack against C.I. activity involving direct competitor
contacts might take any number of forms. For example, Company A is
conducting a study of the prices of its chief competitors' products. Company
A polls its rivals directly by having its C.I. team call the sales and marketing
units of the other companies to ask them about their prices and future price
plans. Later the prices of Company A and all the rivals it contacted become
virtually uniform. Is this phenomenon the result of a tacit or express
conspiracy to fix prices? At the very least, this kind of observable price
parallelism in the marketplace looks suspicious and might raise antitrust
questions. Even if Company A conducted its survey without any intention to
engage in price fixing, its method of information gathering might nonetheless
embroil it in a prolonged antitrust investigation or lawsuit. Since price fixing
is a per se offense, it is irrelevant that Company A lacked any subjective intent
to engage in a price-fixing conspiracy. The direct competitor contacts that
occurred and the subsequent convergence of prices in the marketplace might
be sufficient to convince a judge or jury that the company did, in fact, enter
an unlawful agreement to fix prices. Price fixing is merely one of the antitrust
violations that might be alleged as the result of direct competitor contacts
undertaken pursuant to a C.I. survey.
With the recent increase in C.I. activity, the legality of such activity
under the antitrust laws is an issue that has assumed greater prominence.
Legal counsel must be sensitive to the antitrust risks raised by C.I. activity
conducted by their clients. Corporations must carefully consider the potential
25. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. 208,226-27 (1939); see also United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969) (holding illegal an agreement to exchange price
information).
26. In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court
explained the principle of per se offenses under the Sherman Act: "[Tihere are certain agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. at 5.
Following Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985), it appears that the Supreme Court will now analyze boycotts under a truncated rule
of reason test, id. at 297, even though boycotts are still officially characterized as a per se
offense. Id. at 293-94 (citations omitted). The Court stated that the per se standard should be
applied only when the boycotting organization possesses "market power or exclusive access to
an element essential to effective competition," thereby allowing the boycotting organization to
exclude the boycotted party from engaging in competition. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
27. Under this standard of review, the court will weigh a variety of factors including the
party's intent, its market power, the competitive effect of the conduct, and the presence of
pro-competitivebenefits orjustifications.See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Engineers, 435
U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978).
19951
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antitrust risks of certain forms of intelligence gathering activities before acting.
The Antitrust Division of the United States Justice Department has begun to
examine closely C.I. and benchmarking activities under the federal antitrust
laws. The federal government conducted investigations in Connecticut and
Utah in 1993 regarding salary surveys.28 In both states, hospitals and a trade
association of human resource professionals periodically conducted surveys of
nursing salaries and total compensation.29 According to the Antitrust
Division, the surveys in Utah had the purpose and effect of stabilizing nurses'
salaries." Although the investigation in Connecticut never culminated in a
lawsuit,31 the Antitrust Division and the Utah Attorney General's Office
charged eight Utah hospitals, a state hospital association, and the Utah Society
for Healthcare Human Resources Administration with illegally conspiring to
exchange wage information about registered nurses. 2
The Justice Department's action in Utah and statements made by federal
antitrust officials over the last two years strongly suggest that federal antitrust
enforcement authorities will closely monitor benchmarking and other
competitive intelligence activity. 3  Thus, it is extremely important that
lawyers and their corporate clients recognize the antitrust ground rules in the
C.I. arena. Considering the federal government's increased scrutiny of this
kind of activity, ignorance of the relationship between antitrust laws and C.I.
can be quite costly.34
In Part II of this Article, the author discusses early case law surrounding
information exchanges between competitors to illuminate the legal foundation
upon which recent case law and policy pronouncements are built. In Part I
of this Article, the author discusses more recent developments including the
federal government's new antitrust guidelines, which contain six "safe
28. The United States Justice Department conducted separate investigationsin Connecticut and
Utah in 1993 on the exchange of salary information among competing hospitals. The
investigation in Connecticut never proceeded to trial. In Utah the private defendants settled a
wage fixing complaint which the Justice Department filed against them. See Department of
Justice Press Release (March 14, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
The Utah settlement, in the form of three consent decrees, was submitted to the United States
District Court for the District of Utah for review and final approval. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Anthony I. Dennis, Competitive Intelligence and Antitrust: Can Lightning Strike
Twice?, THE CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE at 12 (Sept. 19, 1994) (hereinafterLifhtning).
32. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 28; see also Anthony J. Dennis, Competitive
Intelligence: Some Guidance For Avoiding Antitrust Liability, 1 HEALTH CARE ANTITRUsT
MANUAL 1 (Sept. 1994) (hereinafter Antitrust Liability).
33. See generally Lightning, supra note 31.
34. See Sherman AntitrustAct § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1993) (violationof § 1 is a felony
punishable by up to three years imprisonment and a $350,000 fine for individuals and a $10
million fine for corporations).
[Vol. 46:263
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harbors" from prosecution. s While these guidelines are directed toward the
health care industry, they are plainly applicable to other industries as well 36
and can clarify the antitrust problems raised by C.I. activity.
Considering the above, the author in Part IV of the Article analyzes and
discusses various methods for collecting and disseminating C.I. The author
makes several recommendations for reducing antitrust risks. It is the author's
hope that these recommendations as well as the analysis of case law and policy
pronouncements will assist members of the bench and the bar in determining
where lawful business activity ends and antitrust liability begins.
11. EARLY CASE LAW
A. Information Exchanges:
A Quartet of Supreme Court Cases from the 1920s
In the 1920s the United States Supreme Court heard four cases involving
the exchange of competitively sensitive information among competitors. In all
but one of the cases, the Supreme Court concluded that an antitrust violation
had occurred. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States7 involved
a group of hardwood manufacturers who exchanged very detailed sales and
pricing information with one another through an unincorporated trade
association.3" The group called its information exchange program an "Open
Competition Plan. " 9 Members of the group supplemented their exchanges
of detailed written reports concerning sales and pricing with regular meetings.
They used these meetings to discuss further the state of sales, production
levels, prices, and other competitively sensitive information within the
hardwood industry.4° The hardwood manufacturers attempted to defend these
practices by asserting that they were substituting "'Co-operative Competition'
for 'Cut-throat Competition'" and that the association members met and
exchanged information for the purpose of "improving the 'human relations'
among the members."41
The Supreme Court, however, disregarded the seemingly benign
justifications given in defense of the "Open Competition Plan."'42 The Court
35. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area, (Sept. 15, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement].
36. See Health Care Policy Statements Can Apply To Competition in All Industries, Corp.
Couns. Wkly. (BNA) 5 (Nov. 3, 1993).
37. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
38. Id. at 391.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 394.
41. Id.
42. American Column & Lumber, 257 U.S. at 410 ("To call the activities of the defendants,
1995]
9
Dennis: Assessing the Risks of Competitive Intelligence Activities Under
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
determined that the meetings and exchanges of detailed sales and price reports
among the membership had the purpose and effect of fixing prices and
controlling production.43 In fact, the Court found that the members of the
association had actually urged price increases and limits on hardwood
production.' Recognizing the frequency of the information exchanges and
the fact that future market conditions as well as current prices and production
were discussed,45 the Court ultimately concluded that the defendants had
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
46
In United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.47 the United States
Supreme Court again examined a formal system of regular information
exchanges between competitors although the medium of the exchange was a
"bureau" instead of an unincorporated trade association.48 The competitors
were manufacturers of linseed oil, cake, and meal. 49  The information
exchange program again was labelled an "open competition" arrangement.50
It required that subscribers submit information relating to sales, quotations,
and offerings, as well as any other information requested by the bureau. 5
Linseed companies that subscribed to this information exchange bureau also
attended monthly meetings.52 As was the group in American Lumber, the
bureau was a sham organization for the exchange of sensitive information
among competitors that had the purpose and effect of stabilizing prices and
limiting competition.53
After American Lumber and Linseed Oil, the question remained open as
to whether competitors could ever exchange information without violating
as they are proved in this record, an 'Open Competition Plan' of action is plainly a misleading
misnomer.").
43. The Court commented:
Genuine competitors do not make daily, weekly and monthly reports of the minutest
details of their business to their rivals .... This is not the conduct of competitors
but is ... clearly that of men united in an agreement, express or implied, to act
together and pursue a common purpose under a common guide ....
Id. at 410.
44. The Court found that the evidence was "sufficient to convincingly show that one of the
prime purposes of the meetings .. . was to induce members to cooperate in restricting
production, thereby keeping the supply low and the prices high .... ." Id. at 404. The Court
further noted that the defendants actively sought higher prices. Id. at 404-05.
45. Id. at 398.
46. American Column & Lumber, 257 U.S. at 411-12.
47. 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
48. Id. at 380.
49. 1d.
50. Id. at 388.
51. Id. at 381.
52. American Linseed Oil Col., 262 U.S. at 384.
53. See id. at 389-90.
[Vol. 46:263
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss2/4
COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v.
United States54 and Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United
States55 the Supreme Court upheld certain information exchanges among
competitors. In Maple Flooring, the Court determined that the information the
parties exchanged involved only past transactions, not current bids or future
market conditions. 6 The Court was satisfied that the information exchange
was not a sham for carrying out a tacit conspiracy in restraint of trade.57
Because the Court could find no concerted action to fix prices or limit
competition, the defendants were exonerated.5
In Cement Manufacturers the Court determined that the information
exchanges between competing cement manufacturers were undertaken for the
purpose of preventing fraud on the part of purchasers.59 The defendants were
concerned that some purchasers might manipulate the bidding system by
declaring several low bids winners for a given project, while actually diverting
some of the favorably priced cement to other projects.' The Court accepted
this justification and allowed the defendants' conduct. 6'
B. Competitor Information Exchanges:
Important Cases from the 1950s Through the 1970s
The Supreme Court and the federal appellate bench further clarified the
Supreme Court's early precedents in the information exchange area in four
cases spanning the years 1956 to 1978.62 These decisions indicated that the
mere exchange of commercially sensitive information between competitors was
not, in itself, a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However,
depending on the facts and circumstances, such information exchanges might
constitute circumstantial evidence of an unlawful agreement between
competitors to fix prices, limit production, or otherwise restrain trade.
The facts in Morton Salt Co. v. United States,63 a 1956 decision,
presented a poorly disguised program of price fixing among competitors in the
salt industry. Representatives of Morton Salt Company and several other
54. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
55. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
56. Maple Flooring, 268 U.S. at 585-86.
57. Id. at 586.
58. Id.
59. Cement Manufacturers, 268 U.S. at 603-04.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 606.
62. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969), Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
63. 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
1995]
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companies, which collectively controlled more than ninety-five percent of the
salt market in the relevant geographic area, interacted routinely to learn of one
another's current and future prices.' The companies even checked their bid
proposals against the bids of other companies before delivering the proposals
to potential customers.' This extensive exchange of sensitive current and
future price information coupled with observable price parallelism in the
market convinced the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that a tacit agreement to
fix prices existed among the defendants in violation of the federal antitrust
laws .6
In 1969 the Supreme Court found certain exchanges of price information
among competing companies to be illegal in United States v. Container Corp.
of America.67 The defendants manufactured corrugated containers and were
responsible for about ninety percent of the corrugated containers shipped from
plants in the southeastern United States.' Upon the request of a competing
company, each defendant would submit "the most recent price charged or
quoted" and would receive the same information in return from the requesting
company. 69
The Court found that "[t]he exchange of price information seemed to have
the effect of keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit."70 Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas stated, "The inferences are irresistible that the
exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect in the
industry, chilling the vigor of price competition .... Price is too critical, too
64. Id. at 575-77.
65. The court commented on a particularly egregious example of the defendants' anticom-
petitive conduct:
Another course of conduct indicating the conspiracy was Freed's requirement that
his sales manager, Jensen, clear all bids through him personally before their
submission ....
Admittedly the requirement that Jensen obtain Freed's approval on bids was
instituted because of Jensen's conduct in attempting to gain business through bidding
lower prices than competitors....
... Jensen was [later] reprimanded by Freed for undercutting the competitor,
and thereafter his authority was strictly limited.
This example of aversion to obtaining business by a lower price, no matter how
minimal, and of the policy to obtain in advance the competitor's bid and studiously
copying that bid exactly, is typical of the conduct of these competing companies as
shown by the record. It seems wholly inconsistent with any conclusion but that a
price conspiracy existed between them.
Id. at 578.
66. Id. at 578-80.
67. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
68. Id. at 336.
69. Id. at 335.
70. Id. at 336.
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sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an informal manner to restrain
competition. "71
Justice Douglas' statement seems to suggest that the exchange of price
information between competitors is per se unlawful. Following Container
Corp., some confusion on the subject developed within the judiciary72 and
within the bar generally.73
Subsequent court decisions have held that such activity does not constitute
a per se offense. In United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,7'
a bank merger case that raised Clayton Act and Sherman Act issues, the
Supreme Court stated that "the dissemination of price information is not itself
a per se violation of the Sherman Act."75 Three years later, the Court
reiterated this conclusion in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,76
stating:
The exchange of price data and other information among competitors does
not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such practices can in
certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and render markets
more, rather than less, competitive. For this reason, we have held that
such exchanges of information do not constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 7
In United States Gypsum Co. the Court addressed the legality of price
information exchanges among members of the highly concentrated gypsum
board industry.7s Under the Robinson-Patman Act, sellers can defend their
71. Id. at 337-38. Justice Douglas appeared influenced by the oligopolistic nature of the
corrugated container industry, which made it particularly susceptible to price stabilization.
Container Corp.,393 U.S. at 337. Douglas also noted that no "controlling circumstance" existed
in this case that might justify the price exchanges. Id. at 335. Consequently, Douglas
distinguished the case from Cement Manufacturers, in which the defendants avoided antitrust
liability by asserting that they had exchanged price information to detect and prevent fraudulent
conduct on the part of cement buyers. Id.
72. Justice Fortas, concurring in Container Corp., stated, "I do not understand the Court's
opinion to hold that the exchange of specific information among sellers as to prices charged to
individual customers, pursuant to mutual arrangement, is aper se violation of the Sherman Act."
Id. at 338-39. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at the same conclusion in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 122-23 (3rd Cir. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 422
(1978).
73. See Norman R. Prance, Price Data Dissemination as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act, 45 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 55, 67 (1983) (stating that, in addition to the courts, "It]he
commentators were also undecided on the meaning of Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion").
74. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
75. Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
76. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
77. Id. at 441 n.16 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 426.
1995]
13
Dennis: Assessing the Risks of Competitive Intelligence Activities Under
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
otherwise discriminatory sales practices by demonstrating that they were
merely meeting the competition's prices.79 The defendants argued that the
information exchanges were merely their means of verifying one another's
prices so that they could remain in compliance with the Robinson-Patman
Act." The Court found this contention unpersuasive and refused to hold that
the Robinson-Patman Act shielded the information exchanges from scrutiny
under the Sherman Act.81
By the end of the 1970s it was clear that while the federal bench would
not view direct exchanges of sensitive information among competitors as
illegal per se, the courts would critically evaluate whether such information
exchanges were a sham for price fixing or other illegal activities. Defendants
who exchanged current or future pricing information, especially pending bid
proposals, stood the greatest risk of liability.' 2 Such exchanges generally
have the greatest tendency to stabilize prices and are sometimes merely
disguised price fixing. The frequency of exchanges between companies also
is directly related to legal risk. Companies that repeatedly checked their
competitors' pending bids or current prices were found guilty of coordinating
their prices in violation of the federal antitrust laws.'s
I. RECENT LAW AND POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS
More recent legal developments in the C.I. area affirm the direction and
interpretations found in earlier court cases and provide a more elaborate road
map for those wishing to conduct C.I. activities safely. A few examples
illustrate this point.
A. Business Review Letters, Consent Decrees
In 1987 the United States Justice Department issued a business review
letter to a group known as the St. Louis Area Business Health Coalition
regarding its proposed survey of hospital costs." The group consisted of
thirty-four major Saint Louis area employers who wished to hold down
medical costs under their group health coverage plans by gathering hospital
cost data. The group specifically stated that hospital participation in the
79. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988).
80. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 453-59.
81. Id. at 458-59. But cf. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588
(1925) (finding information exchanges to be justified when the purpose was to detect and prevent
fraud by buyers).
82. See Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333; Morton Salt, 235 F.2d 573.
83. See Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333; Morton Salt, 235 F.2d 573.
84. See Department of Justice Business Review Letter to St. Louis Area Business Health
Coalition, 1988 WL 252569 (D.O.J.) (Mar. 24, 1988) (on file with author).
[Vol. 46:263
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss2/4
COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
survey would be entirely voluntary and that nonparticipating hospitals would
not be punished. Furthermore, the results of the study would be available to
the public so that the thirty-four participating employers would not gain a
competitive advantage by conducting the survey. Finally, the group expressly
stated that what each member did with the results was its own business. The
group would not act collectively in negotiating contracts with the hospitals.'
Based on these representations, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment stated that it had no present intention of challenging the coalition.8
This business review letter underscores the favorable treatment purchasing
groups often receive under the antitrust laws. Any activity that will lower
costs for consumers generally promotes competition.' In addition, federal
antitrust enforcement authorities are acutely aware that health care costs are
a major policy concern for federal and state governments, politicians, public
policy planners, and consumers. Thus, any group survey of hospital cost
information that has the potential of reducing health care costs stands a decent
chance of being approved by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission.88
Significantly, the Saint Louis coalition reported that the coalition would
merely collect data as a group, allowing each employer to act unilaterally in
utilizing the data. Because members of the group would act unilaterally with
respect to survey results, the coalition was not engaging in "concerted action"
to fix prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 9
In United States v. Burgstinei ° the Justice Department and twenty-two
obstetricians and gynecologists signed a consent decree settling criminal price-
fixing charges against the physicians for exchanging current and future fee
information. Under the consent decree, if the private parties ever integrated
their operations into a bona fide joint venture, they could share confidential fee
information. 91 Also, the parties were permitted to exchange such information
as was necessary to exercise their First Amendment rights before legislative,
judicial, or administrative bodies. 9 This consent decree again illustrates how




88. See generally id.
89. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
90. 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,422 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 1991). See also FTC Letter to
Utah Society of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons (Feb. 8, 1985) (on file with author) (proposal
to exchange fee information raised antitrust concern because (i) the proposal contemplated
dissemination of both ranges of fees and average fees and (ii) the market was concentrated.).
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current or future price/fee information. Such data exchanges present the risk
of investigation and subsequent lawsuits that may result in liability.
More recently, the federal government indicated its reluctance to bless a
competitive fee survey that had the potential of facilitating collusion among its
participants.' In a business review letter issued to the South Suburban Bar
Association, a bar association consisting of lawyers located on the south side
and southern suburbs of Chicago, 4 the U.S. Justice Department "decline[d]
to state its current enforcement intentions" regarding the group's proposed
competitive survey of legal fees.' Although the bar association itself would
collect information on members' legal fees, the Justice Department found that
there were no "procedural safeguards" to ensure that specific fee information
charged by particular lawyers would not be discovered by the membership. 6
Without such a safeguard, the bar association could not prevent its survey
from being used by Association members to agree explicitly or implicitly on
various fees or billing rates in the south-suburban Chicago metropolitan
area.' The Justice Department also noted that bar association members
appeared to constitute a majority of the attorneys in the relevant geographic
market; the group's geographic concentration enhanced the danger that the
survey might facilitate price fixing.98
On March 14, 1994, the Justice Department filed three proposed consent
decrees with the United States District Court for the District of Utah settling
price fixing charges against a human resources trade association, a state
hospital association, and eight Utah hospitals, all of which had been charged
with illegal price fixing by the Department and the Utah Attorney General's
office. 9 The defendants in the" case had conducted a survey of nurses'
salaries for several years and had also met and telephoned one another to learn
of current and prospective nurses' wages. The federal and state authorities
viewed these exchanges as the means by which the participants conspired to
fix nurses' entry level compensation."° The proposed settlement decrees
prohibit the defendants from engaging in this activity.101 The consent
decrees also would require the institution of "comprehensive antitrust compli-
ance programs and" submission of "annual written certifications regarding
93. See Department of Justice Business Review Letter to South Suburban Bar Ass'n, 1993 WL





98. Suburban Bar Letter, supra note 93.
99. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 28. The three identical decrees, if approved, would
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decree compliance throughout the 5 year term of the decrees.""' 2 The Utah
Attorney General simultaneously undertook steps to settle its case.l°3
The Utah investigation and proposed consent decrees illustrate that the
Justice Department not only is aware that C.I. activities regarding salaries and
total compensation take place but that such activities, if not properly
undertaken, can have anticompetitive consequences. In the wake of the Utah
investigation, human resource professionals need to exercise particular care in
gathering wage and compensation information.
B. Joint Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
in the Health Care Area
On September 15, 1993, the United States Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission jointly issued six "Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy" for health care organizations." e While acknowledging
that "[a]ntitrust analysis is inherently fact-intensive," the two federal agencies
desired through the joint issuance of their antitrust guidelines to reduce
uncertainty by "describ[ing] the circumstances under which the Agencies will
not challenge conduct as violative of the antitrust laws as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion."105
The six policy statements address the following areas: "(1) hospital
mergers[,] (2) hospital joint ventures involving high-technology or other
expensive medical equipment[,] (3) physicians' provision of information to
purchasers of health care services[,] (4) hospital participation in exchanges of
price and cost information[,] (5) joint purchasing arrangements among health
care providers[,] and (6) physician network joint ventures.""°6
In setting forth some rules of prosecutorial discretion, the two agencies
did not wish to "imply that conduct falling outside the [six enumerated] safety
zones is likely to be challenged by the Agencies."" °  Rather, "[tihe
102. Id.
103. DOJ Press Release, supra note 28.
104. See Statements of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 35. For a critique of the six policy
statements, see Thomas L. Greaney, A Critique: The Department of Justice/FTC Health Care
Policy Statements, ANTrrRusT, Spring 1994, at 20. "The agencies' eagerness to reassure the
health care industry seems to have overshadowed the ostensible goal of providing detailed
guidance and generated some problematic generalizations. On the positive side, there are several
useful descriptions and clarifications of interpretativeprinciples. . . ." Id. at 24. As this Article
was going through the editing process, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission.issued nine policy statements that supplemented their original pronouncement. See
Statements ofEnforcementPolicy andAnalytical PrinciplesRelating to Health Care andAntitrust,
(Sept. 27, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Analytical Principles].
105. See Statements of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 35, at 1-2.
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statements set forth an outline of the analysis the Agencies will use to review
conduct which falls outside the antitrust safety zones."108
Because both federal antitrust enforcement agencies jointly issued the
guidelines and because the guidelines provide a road map for understanding
federal antitrust investigations and prosecutions, the private bar generally
greeted the six antitrust guidelines with enthusiasm. While on their face the
guidelines apply only to those within the health care industry, the guidelines
might be applied to practices in other industries as well. Significantly, the
Federal Trade Commission's acting director of the Bureau of Competition,
Mary Lou Steptoe, stated that the antitrust policy statements can be applied to
competition issues faced by any trade group or association. 1 9 Ms. Steptoe
then proceeded to mention information sharing and exchanges by name.
10
Even before Ms. Steptoe's announcement, members of the bar found the
guidelines helpful in providing meaningful antitrust advice and direction to
non-health care clients.
In analyzing C.I. activities under the antitrust laws, statement four of the
antitrust guidelines concerning information exchanges between competing
hospitals is particularly helpful.' However, as is indicated above, this
policy statement can be applied to information exchanges between any type of
competitor, regardless of industry. Statement four provides a helpful road
map for safely conducting C.I. surveys and information exchanges. The
federal agencies began policy statement four by acknowledging that "such
surveys can have significant benefits for.. . consumers."" 2 For example,
"[p]urchasers... can use price survey information to make more informed
decisions when buying ... services."11 For their part, the surveying
companies can use the information they glean to price more competitively.,'
The agencies proceeded to state, however, that "[w]ithout appropriate
safeguards ... information exchanges among [competitors]... may facilitate
collusion or otherwise reduce competition on prices or compensation, resulting
in increased prices, or reduced quality and availability of ... services.""'
108. Id. This policy document also set forth an expedited business review procedure that the
Department of Justice is pledged to follow and an expedited advisory opinion procedure that the
Federal Trade Commission is pledged to follow. The document provides for a 90-day review
period starting from the time "all necessary information is received." Id. (emphasis omitted).
109. See Health Care Policy Statements Can Apply To Competition In All Industries, supra
note 36.
110. Id.
111. Statements of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 35, at 22-25.
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The agencies set forth the conditions under which they "will not
challenge, absent extraordinary circumstances" C.I. surveys. 1 16 According
to statement four, surveys must have all of the following characteristics to
avoid being challenged by the federal government:
(1) the survey is managed by a third party (e.g., a purchaser, government
agency, health care consultant, academic institution, or trade association);
(2) the information provided by survey participants is based on data more
than 3 months old; and
(3) there are at least five hospitals reporting data upon which each
disseminated statistic is based, no individual hospital's data represents
more than 25 percent on a weighted basis of that statistic, and any
information disseminated is sufficiently aggregated such that it would not
allow recipients to identify the prices charged or compensation paid by any
particular hospital.
117
Again, given the applicability of the six antitrust statements to other
industries, the word "hospital" might be read broadly to mean any company
participating in a C.I. survey.
Statement four contains additional helpful information and advice. The
agencies state that "[e]xchanges of future prices for hospital services or future
compensation of employees are very likely to be considered anticompeti-
tive.""18  Thus, the exchange of future-oriented competitively sensitive
information is dangerous. Such exchanges should be actively discouraged
because they might lead to coordination among competitors on price or other
commercially sensitive variables, in violation of the antitrust laws. The
overall goal of statement four is to balance a "competitor's individual interest
in obtaining information useful in adjusting the prices it charges or the wages
it pays in response to changing market conditions against the risk that the
exchange of such information may permit [competitors] to communicate with
each other regarding a mutually acceptable level of prices for a [competitor's]
services or compensation for employees. "119
116. Statements of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 35, at 23. The author interprets the
phrase "absent extraordinary circumstances" as merely a method by which federal agencies
sometimes preserve their freedom of action. The author believes that it would be extremely rare
for the federal government to find such circumstances present.
117. Id. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission reiterated these criteria
in statements five and six of their September 1994 policy pronouncement. See Analytical
Principles, supra note 104. Statement five deals with providers' collectiveprovision of fee-related
information to purchasers of health care services. Statement six addresses provider participation
in exchanges of price and cost information. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING ANTITRUST RISK
Broadly speaking, antitrust risk in the C.I. area is a function of three
major factors: (1) the method to be used for gathering competitive intelli-
gence, (2) the kind of intelligence to be collected, and (3) the manner in which
the collected information will be reported or displayed.
A. C.L Gathering Methods
1. Direct Competitor Contacts
As was previously discussed, an employee's first impulse when handed
a C.I. assignment is often to grab the phone and call a competitor directly for
information. This presents the greatest antitrust risk because the direct contact
between the two competitors might create evidence of concerted action in
furtherance of an antitrust violation.' While the parties who spoke to one
another might have had no subjective intent to break the antitrust laws, per se
violations like price fixing, boycotts and market allocations do not require any
requisite state of mind. Furthermore, even though the parties might not have
discussed anything competitively sensitive, a prosecutor or plaintiff might use
the phone record or letter exchange in an attempt to prove that some form of
tacit conspiracy or unlawful subterfuge occurred. For example, the competi-
tors might have merely discussed the color of carpet they preferred in their
offices, the existence of employee health facilities on-site, or the company
cafeteria's hours of operation. A lawyer challenging this competitor
interaction might assert that the parties also discussed product pricing or
pending bids while on the phone. Phone conversations leave no written
records other than the phone bills proving that the conversations took place.
It is practically impossible to prove that employees at two competing
companies limited their telephone conversation to a discussion of the employee
cafeteria or office decor. Thus, unnecessary communication between business
personnel at competing companies should be actively discouraged. The same
holds true for on-site visits. Face-to-face visits present even more opportuni-
ties for employees to "talk shop" and intentionally or unintentionally discuss
competitively sensitive subjects. Because of the potential for antitrust
violations, these visits should be discouraged as well.
C.I. questions presented in letter format present less antitrust risk since
there is a record of what questions were asked. This assumes, of course, that
the questions themselves do not present a significant antitrust risk. Nonethe-
120. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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less, a party conducting a C.I. survey cannot control the amount or type of
information that a company will return in response to each question.
Open-ended questions specifically designed to elicit the maximum amount of
information from other companies are potentially dangerous because these
questions might prompt companies with no legal counsel or less sophisticated
legal counsel to give the requesting company the proverbial "kitchen sink" in
response. This information might include extremely sensitive competitive
information such as product prices, future business plans, new product
rollouts, or the terms of pending or imminent bids. Possession of this
information might be dangerous for the receiving company. Accordingly,
legal counsel should advise their business clients to ask questions that are
focused and avoid open-ended, vague, or extremely general questions that
might inadvertently elicit overly sensitive information.
With oral and written surveys, direct interaction with competitors presents
the greatest antitrust risk1 ' and should be avoided whenever possible.
Direct competitor contacts should be used only as a last resort.
2. Third-Party Noncompetitors
Gathering information from third-party noncompetitors does not present
significant antitrust risk and should be used whenever possible. Only after
exhausting such resources should riskier methods be considered. There is a
plethora of third-party resources available.
a. State and Federal Filings
Many companies are required by law to make various state and federal
filings that often are available to the public. These filings and reports are
good resources when constructing a profile of competing companies." For
example, publicly held corporations operating under the aegis of the federal
securities laws must file quarterly Form 10-Q reports and annual Form 10-K
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." These
reports are publicly available. Furthermore, depending on the industry and the
companies involved, state agencies might also possess valuable information
about particular companies. Insurance companies, for example, are regulated
primarily by state law. They must make periodic filings with the insurance
departments of the states in which they operate. These filings typically are
121. The cases, business review letters, and consent decrees discussed in Part II of this Article
demonstrate this point. See supra notes 22-103 and accompanying text.
122. See COMPETrrOR INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 85-135.
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available to the public. State chartered banks must also make periodic filings
with state banking departments, and hospitals often must file information with
state health departments or hospital commissions. While it is not the most
exciting research, review of these filings may reveal important commercial
information.
b. Library Research
A good corporate library will maintain enough literature on competing
companies to satisfy many of the questions C.I. professionals might have about
other companies.'24 Trade publications and the financial press can provide
valuable information about the companies being surveyed.'2 Sometimes,
research will reveal important articles or interviews that give insight into the
thinking and strategy of competitors. This is frequently true when chief
executives or senior officers of a company give interviews to popular business
magazines or newspapers.'2 Business leaders generally love to talk about
their strategic plans, future goals and "vision" for their company. 127 This
kind of interview can be very revealing and can give competitors a good sense
of how a company will behave in the marketplace.
c. Consultants
Consultants are third-party noncompetitors. Therefore, they provide a
safe means of gathering information.'" Reputable consultants will sign
contracts with a clause protecting the confidentiality of information ten-
dered.129 They will also display data in an aggregated form which does not
attribute any particular data points to specific companies. 30 This is com-
monly called "blinding" the data or presenting it in an "anonymous" format
even though survey participants might be listed in an appendix.'
124. See COMPETrrOR INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 24-27; see MONrrORiNG THE
COMPETrrON, supra note 6, at 123-36.
125. Leonard Fuld provides a list of business and trade association publishers and their
addresses that might be profitably mined for ideas. See COMPETrrr INTELLIGENCE, supra
note 4, at 425-58.
126. See id. at 298-300.
127. See id.
128. The Federal Trade Commission and Justice Departmentjoint policy statements encourage
parties to use consultants or ofher third party noncompetitors to gather C.I. See Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 35.
129. See Lightning, supra note 31, at 7.
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B. Kind of Competitive Intelligence Collected
1. Some Subjects More Sensitive Than Others
Common sense prevails in this area. Some highly sensitive subjects
include the following: prices, customer lists, salaries or compensation, pending
bid situations, markets that competitors intend to enter or exit, new products
that will be introduced soon, budgets, available capital, acquisition or
divestiture plans, and strategic plans. Nonetheless, if this data is gathered and
reported properly, these questions may be posed to competitors.
By contrast, questions concerning office decor, employee health clubs,
and parking facilities are inherently less sensitive. However, even these
benign-sounding questions can become fraught with danger if they are
followed by questions concerning the price paid for the services. If the
company conducting the survey asks these questions, then sets salaries or
contracts with a particular vendor in light of that information, the company
might risk being accused of price fixing. These examples illustrate that even
apparently harmless questions should be reviewed carefully before they are
posed to other corporations.
2. Historic vs. Current or Future-Oriented Information
In terms of the freshness of information collected, guidelines recently
issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
indicate that collected data should be "more than 3 months old." 132  The
author believes that this admonition applies particularly to sensitive items such
as pricing and salary information but would likely have little or no applicabili-
ty to the more benign questions discussed above. As a general rule, the
collection of historic data presents less antitrust risk than the collection of
current or future-oriented information.133 C.I. professionals will, of course,
want to obtain current or future-oriented C.I. whenever possible. Thus, a
tension exists between the legal safeguards of collecting solely historic data
and the C.I. advantages of obtaining current or future-oriented informa-
tion. 
134
132. See Statements of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 35, at 23.
133. See supra notes 37-83 and accompanying text.
134. The author does not mean to suggest that business clients may never pursue current or
future-oriented C.I. If such information can be found in the public domain or is available from
third-party noncompetitors, then clients may obtain such information without much antitrust risk.
Nonetheless, regardless of the manner in which it was obtained, current or future-oriented C.I.
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C. Method of Displaying Collected Data
Statement four of the FTC-Department of Justice joint statement provides
guidance regarding the means by which competitive data can be safely
displayed. 135 That statement clearly indicates that competitive information
should be "sufficiently aggregated" so that participants cannot attribute the
prices charged, compensation paid, or other competitive information to any
particular survey participant.'36 In order to meet effectively statement four's
guidelines, at least five companies must participate in the survey. 37 It is
clear from the statement that company names should not be linked in the final
report to particular items of data; at most, the report can merely list the names
of the participants separately.'
D. Other Factors
1. Frequency of C.L Surveys or Information Exchanges
Several other factors affect the antitrust risk associated with C.I. activity.
The frequency of C.I. exchanges affects antitrust risk because frequent surveys
among competitors allow for greater coordination in the market among them.
Regardless of whether companies are actually using frequent C.I. surveys to
coordinate their market conduct, the frequency of such surveys might give the
false appearance that tacit collusion is taking place. 3 9 Appearances alone
might lead to a government investigation or the filing of a lawsuit.
2. Number of Participants
The number of companies participating in a given C.I. survey also affects
antitrust risk. If a large number of companies from a particular industry
participate in a survey there is a greater chance of collusion or coordination
among them."4 Furthermore, even if the parties unilaterally decide how to
use the C.I. information,"' the fact that an entire industry has participated





140. STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 35, at 23; see also MONrroRiNG
THE COMPETION, supra note 4, at 18.
141. A standard quid pro quo among companies participating in C.I. surveys is that
participation entitles companies to receive the final report. Thus, presenting the collected data on
an aggregated and anonymous basis minimizeiantitrust risk.
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in the survey might give the appearance of collusion and lead to an antitrust
investigation or lawsuit.142
3. Market Concentration
A highly concentrated market containing few competitors presents the risk
that any action those competitors take together might appear or actually be
unlawful. 143 Thus, participation in a C.I. survey by most corporations in a
concentrated market, regardless of the benign nature of the questions or the
manner in which data are collected and displayed, might place participating
companies at risk of running afoul of the antitrust laws. 144
V. CONCLUSION
The author expects more legal action in the competitive intelligence field.
Corporate America is making widespread use of competitive intelligence
information and will probably continue to gather C.I. in the years ahead. At
the same time, federal and state antitrust enforcement agencies are becoming
increasingly aware of these activities and their potential for abuse. The
Department of Justice's proposed settlement decrees in Utah and its issuance
of guidelines with the Federal Trade Commission illustrate this fact.
The author has explained the state of the law in competitive intelligence
and set forth recommendations for reducing potential antitrust risks associated
with C.I. activities in the hope that legal violations can be minimized.
142. See MoNrrORING THE COMPETrION, supra note 4, at 18; see also Lightning, supra note
31, at 14.
143. See MONrrORING THE COMPETMON, supra note 4, at 18; see also Lightning, supra note
31, at 14.
144. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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